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Theoretically as we ll as experimentally it is investigated how �ple repr· esent their knowledqe i.n oruer to make decision or. to share their knowledge with oth ers. Experiment 1 probef.', into the ways how l=€Ople qctther infonnation c.100 ut the frequencies of events ard how thiB knowledge is interfered with by the requested response mode, that is, nunerical vs. verl:nl estiootes. The le,:�st interference occurs if the subjects ar·e a l l owed to q.ive verbal responses. From this it is conch.rled t.ha.t procef3SiTYJ l<nowla: lqe al:out unc ertainty categor ically, that is, by means of verbal expressions, impo�'les leag mento. l work loo.d on the orgrmi::lll l thnn nUTler.ical processirq.
PoE' . sibility theory is used as a framework for modell irq the Irdividual Uf' : >ilge of verbal mteqories for qrader; of uncertainty.
The 'ela. <Jt.ic' constraints on the verbnl expressions for every simle subject are determined in Experiment 2 by mecmg of sequential testir�. In further experiments it is shown that the superiority of the ved:xtl processirrr of knowledqe about uncerta inty quite generally reduces persistent biases reported in the literature: conservatism (Experiment 3) ard neqliqence of regression (Experiment 4). In a final experiment (5) about predid.ions in a nx.'\1-··life sitmtion it turns out that in a nunerical forecastirq tas k su biects restricted them. . co,elves to those p:-u:ts of their knowledge which are nutteri ml . On the other hand subject s in a verbal forecastim task accessed ver bally as well as nunerically stated knowledge . Heyna, 1981) .
Forcas t. irq is
In most studien on sub-j l:)ctive probabi 1 i ty and the biases under 1 y i ng these judgments it has been imp l icitly assumed that the information is stor-ed symbolically (in this case in the numerica l mode) and that by means of retrieva l the numbers represent i nq the know 1 edge about uncertainty can be q i von immediate ly and that there is no loss of information between the accessed information and the answers given. Any inconsistency between information intak e (the objective side) and the numerica lly expressed sub i ect i ve probab U it y ( th�) sub i ect i ve side) is then ascribed to the procedures applied in retrieval. That is, the subjects has presumedly chosen an inappropriate algorithm or heuristic in either accessinq the i nformation or in deriving conc l usions from it. Examp les for 1!.uch procedural fallacies are overconfidence, conservatism (i .e . sticking to an initial appraisa l of a situation in spite of new information available for revision), and negliqence of the regression effect (i.e. the imp l icit assumption of a perfect correlation between the predictor variable and the criterion).
The approach taken here takes off by asking how the expected f ceq u en c J e s o f u n c e l:' t a i n eve n t s a r· e :c e p r-NJ en t e d i n tern a 11 y ( e . q .
( i ) in a verba l propositional mode, (ii) in a numerica l propositional mode, or (iii) in an analogue mode of automatic frequency monitoring (Zadeh, 1978) and the procedures applicab le to them (e.q. hedginq). Since this theory allows for a numerical interpretation by means of determining the elastic constraints on the usaqe of such expressions, the resu 1 ts gained by interpreting vecba l expressions of uncertainty as possibility functions can be compared to the resu 1 ts of the above mentioned studies, where sub i ects bad to �xpress their judgments numerically.
The first step in the investigation of the internal representation of uncertainty was to ask how people gather the know l edge, from which by means of retrieval the verba 1 expressions for the probabilities of uncertain events are derived, One can assume that for repetitive events, e. g. the outcomes of bal l qames or the daily weather, people monitor the frequencies of outcomes automat i ca 11 y and revise their know ledge accordingly.
Such an automatic monitorinq of freqtwncie:::; seems to be a plausible candidate for the initial mode of representation underlying the generation of judgments concerning subjective probabilities.
In Experiment 1 it w�s attempted to determine if human observers are able to monitor the frequencies of more than one unattended stimulus attribute.
It turned out that the moda lity of the response was critica l for the subjects' ability to assess frequencies of events in the unattented stimulus attributes. The results show that (i) the verba l judgments were mor.e precise than the numerical ones,
(ii) in a 11 cases the second frequency .i udgments were not as precise as the first ones, but, most importantly, the impairment was less severe when the first iudgment was verbnl. From these results it seems plausible to conclude, first, that more than one unattended variable can be automatically monitored, but that the iudgmental precision depends on the mode of probing this knowledge. Second, if more than one judgment has to be made, there is interference between them, but the amount of interference depends on the modes of the judgments.
The apparent superiority of the verbal mode leads to the tentative interpretation that the verbal mode for representing knowledge processes information more effectively than the numerical mode.
If the overload of thcj mental processing capacity necessitates the application of heuristics, and if biases in human judgment can be traced back to mistaken applications of heuristics (for an overview see Nisbett and Ross, 1980) , the following conjecture seems plausible: Any mode of judgment imposing less mental work load should be more valid than one requiring more mental processing capacity, ever ything else beinq equal.
Modelling the meanings of verbal labels for relative frequencies is straightforward in the framework of fuzzy set theory. The universe of discourse is the unit interval and the regions of applicability, possible a. pplico.bility, and inapplicability can be determined empirically, that is, the expressions are interpreted as fuzzy numbers in the unit interval. The resulting possibility functions for a given set of verbal expressions are depicted in Figure 1 . The spacing Zimmer (1980) has shown that such equidistant and equally shaped categories are conversationally optimal, but it has to be kept in mind that this communicability constraint is a simplifying assumption, which is not a prerequisite for this kind of modelling.
Experiment 2 consisted of three parts. In the first part a survey was taken of the verbal expressions used by the subjects for the description of uncertain events, in part 2 the fuzzy meanings of verba 1 expressions of every individual sub i ect for uncertain events were empirically determinea ty a modified R0bblhs-Monroe procedure and in part 3 these meanings were tested for calibration by comparing the individual subjective expectations of success in knowledge-test items with the actual individual probability of success as derived from the 1-parameter logistic test model.
The survey revealed that subjects differed in the number of verbal categories they spontaneously used for uncertain events. Furthermore, the meanings of these verbal cateqories were not the same for all subjects. In order to determine the fuzzy numbers in the unit interval an item j1 Oj. These estimateB in turn allow for an assessment of the probability that subje ct i solves item J, according to the following formula:
.j Figure 2 gives the diffi culty-by-label curves for all subjects using cum� f. where subie cts tend to sti ck to their initial assumptions concerning the probability of events despJ. te the E act that in the light of new i nf ormation they should revise these assumptions. The optimal revision strategy for estimates in this task is the appli cation of Bayes' theorem, which therefore can be used as a normative standard for the subje cts' performance.
In a series of experiments Phillips and Edwards (1966) In Experiment 4 subjects were asked to predict the individual success of students at the university from their performance in highschool. In order to let subjects develop their notion of the correlational re lat i onshi p between highschool and college performance, they were given a sample of 75 typical cases of grades students received at h ighschoo 1 and in the gn1duat i ng exam at the university. Afterwards they had to predict the performance at the university of 50 students on the basis of their highschool grades. The results were very similar to those obtained by Kahneman and Tversky (1973) but when the subjects were asked how certain they were about the correctness of their predictions, they gave quite 1 ow subjective degrees of conf i dence.
When probed further about the direction of their probable error of pr-ediction 27 out of JO s ub j e cts indicated correctly tha t the true value would probably be closer to the mean performance than they had predic ted .
This result as well as those reported above seem to indicate that. subjects are better able to take into account complex dependencies by means of verbal processing than i£ they are forced to process the same amount of information numerically.
As G regory (1982) points out, numbers and computation form a more recent tool of mind than language and therefore the numerical information processing is less automatic.
In experiment 5 subjects (24 hank clerks responsible for foreign exchange) were asked to predict what the exchange rate between the (JS Dollar and the Deutschmark would be four weeks later. Twelve subjects had to give the predictions ''in their own words as they would talk to a client", whereas the other twelve werf� asked to give numerical estimates in percentage of change, Both grou ps were asked to verbalize the steps they took in order to come up with the prediction. After the pr.edictiorw of the f:lr:-st qroup had boen cr i librated with a technique similar to that used in Experiment 2, they were compared to the predicti on n made by the numerical foreca�3tinq qroup.
It turned out
that the first group was more correct and more internally consistent. While this is i nt ere s t inq in itself, another-point is more imp ortant :
The slight difference in the instructions caused marked differences in the �•ay the sub j e ct s porformed their task as r-eve aled by tho ver bo l protocol.
The verbal predi ction group used quantitative variables Co. q. the GNP i nc r 8 o.se in percent) as we 11 as qualitat i ve var iab 1 es (e.g. the stability of the German government) for deriving their pr:ed i. ct i o ns, whereas the· othet� qroup mere 1 y took into account t hose variables which are usually expressed numerically. From this it seems plausible to assume that one reason for the superiority in the ver bal forecasting condition is the fact that the knowledge base on which ·t hes e sub i ects re 1 i ed was broa de r and a 11 o wed for more elaboration. However, it has to be kept in mind that the heuristic of causal .schema ta can be also misleading; Nisbett & Ross (1980) r-eport ample evidence for the deleterious effects of misinterpreting diagnostic information as causa l . The major difference between the studies reported in Nisbett & Ross (1980) and this experiment lies in the fact that the bank cler-ks were a c tively searchinq for information and only implemented their own knowledge into their reasoning.
The s tudies of Begq (1982 ), Zimmer (1982 , as well as the theoretical analysis of "rational belief" by Kyburg (1983) indicate that de scribing human reasoning in the framework of classical loqic might be a mistaken approach. The proposed alternative starts from the assumption that peo pl e usually start with making a claim about a given problem (e.g. the estimation of the probability of a rare event). A f t erwards they justify this claim by giving the underlying train of arguments and the available evidence favorable for the claim. Counter arguments and/or contracting evidence forces them either to revise the claim or to refute the argumentative alternatives.
We are devel oping a mode l which helps the decision maker to check the arguments by which he or she backs or justifies the claim made. 1983) or are given in their original numerical form together with the elasti c constraints. If the subjective evaluation of the claim by the deci.sion maker and the analytical evaluation are about the same, the inter a c t i ve process ends. If, however, the expert disagrees, he or she is asked to give further grounds or to revise the credibility ratings for the facts given.
The interactive model for the elucidation of arguments underlying the claims (e.q. predictions, diaqnoses) of experts on the on hand serves as a mean.s for an unbiased probability asses.sment for claims.
Insofar it resembles the procedure proposed by Henrion and Morgan (see Morgan, in press). On the other hand, however, it makes explicit the knowledge base on whic h the expert grounds his/her claim. The comparison of the knowledge bases underlying the predictions of different experts for the same evt:nt shows if these predictions are ba.sed on more or less 223 same reasons or not.
In the first case an agglommeration of the evaluations made by different experts is admissible.
In the other case, however, only those judgments can be pooled which are based on comparable knowledge bases. 
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